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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory
appeal by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j).

This appeal is from the order of the Third

Judicial District Court in and for Summit County denying
defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint.
Defendants' Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was granted by
this Court on March 7, 1990. The order to be reviewed is the
Order dated December 28, 1989 and entered January 3, 1990.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue presented for review is whether Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as amended) applies to provide for
the refiling of an action originally filed pursuant to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-1, et
seq., when the original Complaint was subsequently dismissed
for a cause otherwise than upon the merits.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This interlocutory appeal presents no disputed facts
for review by this Court.

The issues presented involve

questions of statutory interpretation which are questions of
law.

This Court is required to review the lower court's

decision for correctness without according deference thereto.
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

-iv-

STATUTES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended):
§ 78-12 iu. It any action is commenced
within due time and a judgment thereon for
the plaintiff is reversed, or if the
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a
cause of action otherwise than upon the
merits, and the time limited either by law
or contract for commencing the same shall
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies
ind the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new actJ m
within one year after the reversal 01
t ai 1 uie ,

§ b7-1-32. At any time within three months
after any sale of property undei a trust
deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may
be commenced to recover the balance due upon
the obligation for which the tiusf deed was
given as security, and in such action the
complaint shall set forth the entire amount
of the indebtedness which was secured by
such trust deed, the amount for which such
property was sold, and the fair market value
thereof at the date of sale. Before
rendering judgment , the court shall find the
fair market value at the date of sale of the
property sold. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which
the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the sale. In any
action brought under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to
collect its costs and reasonable attorney
fees incurred in hringinq an action under
this section.
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Counsel for defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint on April 5, 1988.

The basis for the Motion to

Dismiss was plaintiff's failure to "issue" two summonses within
the period required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(b), as
it read at that time.

The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the

lower court in an Order dated May 2, 1988.

The Order provides

that "Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint are dismissed
without prejudice." (emphasis added).

(R.7)

Plaintiff refiled, seeking the same relief against
defendants, on March 13, 1989.

(R.l).

One of the defendants,

Rufe Soule, was served on or about July 18, 1989.

(R.25).

The

second Complaint was filed within the one-year statutory period
established by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40.
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's
Complaint on September 18, 1989.

(R.27).

That motion was

denied by the lower court in an Order entered on January 3,
1990.

(R.76).

It is the lower court's denial of defendants'

Motion to Dismiss which provides the basis for this
interlocutory appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED.

The original Complaint in this action was filed within
the three month period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32
(1953, as amended).

The original complaint was dismissed for a

reason "otherwise than upon the merits."
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IV.

DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE TRUST DEED STATUTE IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.

In Point II of their Brief, defendants raise a new
argument which is not found in the record, was not argued in
the court below, and has not been certified for appeal.

This

Court cannot properly review matters which have never been
raised in the lower court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED.
Plaintiff's action was filed within the statutory
limits of Utah law.

The trustee's sale of the subject property

was conducted on March 11, 1987.

The original Complaint in

this action was filed on June 8, 1987, within the three month
period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (the "trust deed
statute").

The original complaint was dismissed, without

prejudice, on May 2, 1988.

The sole reason for dismissal was

plaintiff's failure to issue summonses within the three month
period required by Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as
it read at that time.

(R.7).

The timely filing of the

original Complaint was never at issue.
The original Complaint was dismissed for a reason
"otherwise than upon the merits" and falls squarely within the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as amended),
(the "savings statute").

That statute provides:

-4-

If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited
either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or
if he dies and the cause of action survives,
his representatives, may commence a new
action within one year after the reversal or
failure. (Emphasis added).
The statute operates to extend the time within which any action
may be filed where there has not been an adjudication upon the
merits.
There are three conditions for the application of the
savings statute.

First, an action must have been commenced.

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a
civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the
court, . .H

This Rule does not establish any other requirement

for the "commencement" of an action.

There is no dispute that

plaintiff's first complaint was timely filed within three
months of the trustee's sale.
A second requirement for the application of the
statute is that plaintiff's action fails "otherwise than on the
merits."

There was no trial of this case "upon the merits."

The dismissal of the original Complaint was premised solely
upon the application of the technical operation of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
prejudice.

The dismissal was without

The second precondition to the application of the

savings statute has been satisfied.

Finally, a party seeking the benefit of the savings
statute must refile its action within one year of the dismissal
or other failure.

Plaintiff's second deficiency action was

filed on March 13, 1989, less than one year after the lower
court's original order.

This case is squarely within the

provisions of the savings statute.
POINT II
THE TIME LIMITATION FOUND WITHIN THE UTAH TRUST DEED
STATUTE MAY BE EXTENDED BY APPLICATION OF THE SAVINGS
STATUTE.
Defendants mistakenly contend that strict construction
of the Utah trust deed statute prohibits application of the
savings statute. Despite the defendant's elaborate and lengthy
argument this contention lacks authority or analysis.
Defendants' contention might have some merit if dismissal of
the prior suit was rooted in the plaintiff's failure to comply
with any provision of the trust deed statute.

Significantly,

the defendants cannot identify any failure by plaintiff to
comply with the Utah trust deed statute.
Plaintiff has fully complied with the strict
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-1, e^c seg.

In neither of

their motions to dismiss below did the defendants identify a
single deviation from the statutory guidelines.

Their attempt

now to allege a deviation for the first time before this Court
is improper.

The allegation raised in "Point II" of their

brief, that plaintiff failed to allow a three month

reinstatement period prior to filing its notice of sale, was
not presented to the court below.

Consequently, that

contention has not been ruled upon upon or even addressed by
the lower court.

That issue, if indeed it exists, is not now

properly before this Court and should be granted no
consideration in this appeal.
The sale of the subject property was valid and an
action to collect upon the deficiency was commenced within the
three month period.

The action was dismissed without

prejudice, not because of any failure to comply with the trust
deed requirements, but because of a failure to timely issue the
summonses.

This is precisely the purpose for which the savings

statute was enacted.
A dismissal for a procedural failure is not a decision
upon the merits.

Gutheil v. Gilmer, 27 Utah 496, 76 P. 678

(1930), Williams v. Nelson, 45 Utah 255, 145 P. 39 (1914),
Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187
(1923).

The May 2, 1988 order itself provides that the action

is dismissed "without prejudice."

Contrary to defendants'

analysis, the requirements of the trust deed statute are not
altered, or in any way compromised, by the application of the
savings statute.

Each statute serves a specific and separate

purpose, yet neither exists in a vacuum.

If the Court were to

accept defendants' analysis, the savings statute would have no
application in matters involving the trust deed statute.

The three month period provided by the trust deed
statute for commencing actions to recover deficiencies would,
in the majority of cases, provide insufficient time to refile
an action after dismissal for any reason, regardless of whether
the requirements of the trust deed statute were originally met
or not.

In other words, applying defendants' analysis,

subsequent refiling of deficiency actions, dismissed for any
procedural failure not related to the requirements of the
deficiency statute, are barred.

Had the legislature intended

that result, it certainly could have so provided in the text of
the statute.
In Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352
(Utah 1980), the Court reviewed two separate statutes which had
provided the basis for dismissal of that action in the lower
court.

One of those statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8,

provides in pertinent part:
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be initiated unless and until
the plaintiff gives the prospective
defendant or his executor or successor, at
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to
commence an action.
The plaintiff in Yates had neglected to provide the ninety
days' notice as required by the malpractice Act.

Failure to

comply with that provision was one basis for dismissal.

This

Court held that § 78-12-40 applied to allow plaintiff one year
from the dismissal date to refile the Complaint.

The dismissal of plaintiffs action against the
governmental entity was, on the other hand, upheld.

The

court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against the Vernal
Family Health Center, a governmental entity, was based upon
plaintiff's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13
which provides:
A claim against a political subdivision is
barred unless notice of claim is filed with
the governing body of the political
subdivision within one year after the cause
of action arises. (Emphasis added.)
The Court held that § 63-10-13 was dispositive and upheld the
lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's action against the
Health Center on that basis.

The Court placed emphasis on the

fact that the statute expressly provided that claims not
complying therewith are "barred."

The language of the statute

itself allowed for no other interpretation.
Legislature was clear.

The intent of the

No similar intent is expressed in the

trust deed statute.
As defendants point out in their Brief, the savings
statute was in existence long before the trust deed statute was
enacted.

In enacting the trust deed statute, and determining

the effect of the provisions contained therein, the legislature
could have provided that actions not commenced within three
months of a trustee's sale are barred.

It did not do so or in

any other way indicate or infer that § 78-12-40 should not be

applied to allow the refiling of a deficiency action in the
event of a dismissal of that action not on the merits.
The contention that the trust deed statute impliedly
amended the savings statute is completely without merit.

There

is no basis in the legislative history of the trust deed
statute, or in subsequent judicial interpretations of that
statute which would suggest an abrogation of § 78-12-40.
Section 78-12-40 applies to "any action" commenced under Utah
law.
Section 78-12-40 is clear and unambiguous and states
plainly that it applies to any action commenced within due time
which fails otherwise than upon the merits.

The words "any

action," without limitation or qualification, mean "any
action."

They do not mean "any action not based upon statute."

The defendants acknowledge, "Where a statute is clear upon its
face and is susceptible of but one construction, that
construction must be given to it."

Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175

U.S. 414, 421, 20 S.Ct. 155, 44 L.Ed. 219 (1899).
Defendants argue that the savings statute applies
solely to causes of action recognized at common law.

Utah

courts have consistently refused to adopt the defendants'
restrictive interpretation.

Limitation periods have been

extended, through the invocation of the savings statute, in the
application of Utah's Wrongful Death statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-11-12 (1953, as amended), Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343

(Utah 1980); the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq. (1953, as amended), Foil v. Ballinger,
601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); and the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et: seq. (1953, as amended),
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
In its most recent decision on the subject, Madsen v.
Borthick, supra, this Court determined that the Utah savings
statute extended a cause of action brought pursuant to Utah's
Governmental Immunity Act.

The Court held:

One purpose of section 78-12-40 is to assure
that claimants are not deprived of
potentially valid suits by appeals that are
not resolved until after the applicable
periods of limitations run. In accordance
with that purpose, we have held that if
dismissal of the first action is appealed,
section 78-12-40's extension of time for
filing a second action runs from the date of
the dismissal's affirmance.
Other Utah cases have applied the savings statute to
"statutory" causes of action.

In Foil v. Ballinger, supra, a

plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act (the "Malpractice Act").

The plaintiff's

complaint was dismissed because of her failure to serve a
notice of intent to sue as required by § 78-14-4.

She later

complied with the provisions of the Malpractice Act, but her
second complaint was filed outside the Malpractice Act's
statute of limitation.

The Court noted that as the first "suit was dismissed
without prejudice, the dismissal was not an adjudication on the
merits,"

As such, the savings statute was applicable.

"Plaintiff therefore had the right to refile the action within
one year if the first action had been properly "commenced" as
that term is used in § 78-12-40."

Id. at 149.

This is the

same result as that reached in Yates v. Vernal Family Health
Center, supra.
Significantly, defendants cite no Utah authority for
their proposition that the savings statute merely applies to
common law causes of action.

There is no rationale for this

separation and, in modern jurisprudence, it is an artificial
distinction.

The codification of the statutes of limitation

themselves undermines defendants' theory—the general statutes
of limitations themselves incorporate "statutory" claims. See,
e.g., § 78-12-26(4), Utah Code Ann.

Contrary, therefore, to

defendants' argument that the inclusion of the savings statute
in Chapter 12 of Title 78 indicates that it was intended to
apply only to common law causes of action, the savings statute
applies to causes of action created by statute as well.
The artificial character of defendants' distinction
between statutory and common law causes of action is
underscored by their own analysis.

While defendants proclaim

that this distinction is dispositive on page 20 of their brief;

by page 23, they admit that the distinction is only valid where
the statute does not contain an internal limitations period.
This Jesuitical attempt at definition is neither supported by
statute nor logic.
The only authority defendants can muster in support of
their theory is AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986).

In Raintree, however, no

suit was commenced within the statutory period.

Plaintiffs in

the instant case commenced their suit in a timely fashion, a
fact which defendants acknowledge.
applicable.

Raintree, therefore, is not

The savings statute applies to all causes of

action unless its application is specifically excluded by
statute or unless a statute provides that a cause of action is
"barred" by failure to comply with a particular limitation
period or notice provision.
POINT III
APPLICATION OF THE SAVINGS STATUTE TO THE TRUST DEED
STATUTE IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS APPLICATION TO ALL
OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION
Plaintiffs original Complaint was filed within the
three month period prescribed by the trust deed statute. The
filing of that Complaint put defendants on notice that
plaintiff intended to recover from defendants the deficiency
remaining after the trustee's sale.

Defendants then made the

tactical decision to avoid the determination of plaintiff's

claims on the merits by moving for dismissal on the basis that
plaintiff had made a procedural error in the issuance of the
summonses.

Plaintiff committed a procedural error and

defendants' motion was successful.

Plaintiff's Complaint was

dismissed.
At the time defendants sought and obtained dismissal
of plaintiff's Complaint, the savings statute was in effect.
It was not something conjured up by plaintiff at a later date
in an attempt to deny defendants any protection afforded by
law. It was, in fact, and remains, a venerable statute upon
which plaintiff was entitled to rely in refiling its action
against defendants.

Plaintiff's renewed action seeks nothing

more or less than did its original Complaint.

In actuality,

defendants have already enjoyed the benefit of the trust deed
statute's three month filing provision and remain protected by
the statute's other provisions, including the fair market value
restriction on recovery of the deficiency.
Defendants would persuade this Court that application
of the one year savings period to a three month statute of
limitation renders an absurd result.
supported by law or logic.

Their conclusion is not

In fact, the law in Utah supports

the application of the savings statute to shorter periods.
Foil v. Ballinger, supra., the Court held that the savings
statute allowed the plaintiff to refile her action which had

In

been dismissed for her failure to comply with the Health Care
Malpractice Act's ninety day notice requirement.
Regardless of the limitation period applicable to any
given cause of action, the result of applying the savings
statute is the same.

Defendants in each case are required to

defend an action which, without application of the statute,
would be barred.

Certainly, that result is not welcomed by any

defendant, whether that defendant initially benefitted from a
three month or a six year limitation period.

A defendant's

reluctance to defend a cause of action on the merits, however,
has never been grounds to deny application of the savings
statute.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFF'S FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE TRUST DEED STATUTE IS NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT.
In Point II of their brief, defendants raise a
completely new argument, not found in the record or argued
before the court below.

This matter is before this court upon

an interlocutory appeal from the lower court on the sole issue
of the application of the savings statute to the proceedings
herein.

No evidence or law was presented to the trial court

judge and this ruling did not address defendants' argument.
The Supreme Court does not review matters which have never been
raised in the lower court.

Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad

Company, 111 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903 (1947).

Further, defendants* second contention was not
certified for appeal.

The Certification for Appeal dated

December 19, 1989 (R. 91-92) makes no mention of this issue.
Defendants' Petition for Permission to Appeal dated January 11,
1990 (R. 80-83) also omits any mention of this issue.

Despite

an exhaustive discussion of their first point, defendants make
no mention of the second issue.

This court should not sanction

appeal by ambush.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's original Complaint was timely filed and
complied with all of the provisions of the trust deed statute.
Plaintiff's original Complaint failed otherwise than upon the
merits.

The savings statute operates to extend the time within

which any action which has failed otherwise than on the merits
may be filed.

Application of the savings statute to the trust

deed statute is consistent with its application to every other
cause of action, whether based upon statute or founded in
common law.

Application of the savings statute to the trust

deed statute is also consistent with this Court's prior rulings
applying the savings statute to causes of action created by
statute.

The savings statute was in effect when the

legislature enacted the trust deed statute and the legislature
was not, arguably, unmindful of its existence.

Nor, arguably,

were defendants unmindful of its existence when they obtained
dismissal of plaintiff's original Complaint.

They had no

reason to believe, therefor, that plaintiff would not refile
its action pursuant to the provisions of the savings statute.
For these reasons, and those discussed above, this Court should
uphold the clear meaning of the savings statute by holding that
it does apply to the trust deed statute and remand this matter
to the District Court for trial on the merits.
DATED this 2 5 ^ ^ day of July, 1990.
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